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Introduction
Security is a broad concept. The aspect of security is linked with its opposites: the 
semanƟ c concept of risk (or threat), accident, dangerous occurrence, vicƟ m, loss, 
damage, level of damage. Related concepts are those of risk, the level of risk, 
defense, protecƟ on from threats, prevenƟ on, etc. Both the term ‘security’ and 
the term ‘threat’ have a wide range of meanings. Security is associated with the 
relevant data, informaƟ on, knowledge, experience, training, procedures,, and 
strategies for the prevenƟ on and minimizaƟ on of threats and the losses incurred. 
Security is linked to measures, costs, and expenditure, which depend on the size 
and scale of the threat. Security, threat assessment, prevenƟ on, the costs have 
a logical relaƟ on. The level, structure, and dynamics of threats in space and Ɵ me 
should be adequately responded to by methods of security strategy, and the na-
ture of their applicaƟ ons.
The issue of security
The individual aspects of security from a structural point of view can be assessed 
in diﬀ erent ways. The security of mankind but also the individual can be generally 
subdivided as follows:
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• Against threats from space — for example, comets or asteroids. In the period 
from 16 July to 22 July 1994 the core of the Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 broke 
into more than 20 parts and hit the southern hemisphere of Jupiter, which 
allowed the fi rst direct observaƟ on of a collision of two celesƟ al bodies in the 
solar system.1 In the following years, astrononomers noted the impact of this 
celesƟ al body on Jupiter, one of the craters was the size of the Earth.2 Up to 
900 asteroids have a diameter greater than 1 km, while a potenƟ ally danger-
ous one is 990 m (data according to the staƟ sƟ cs of the Minor Planet Center 
in Cambridge, MA, USA).3
“In parƟ cular, asteroids near the planet are in themselves a big potenƟ al for 
science. But they are not only for science but also for the normal life of people. 
Although it may seem that they sƟ ll are the greatest threat to the existence of 
mankind and all life on Earth. And maybe someƟ me in the future they will be-
come a rich source of minerals and the launch pad for exploring the universe.”4
• Against threats of natural forces on the planet Earth. The earthquake and tsu-
nami in March 2011 in Japan killed thousands of people and damaged the 
nuclear reactors in Fukushima, with the result that hydrogen escaped into 
the atmosphere and dangerous radioacƟ ve substances polluted the sea. AŌ er 
the reactor explosion four Japanese prefectures were contaminated by radio-
acƟ city. Many people were evacuated. Several countries halted imports of 
foodstuﬀ s from Northern Japan. Japan, according to the experts of the IAEA, 
underesƟ mated the threat posed by earthquakes and tsunamis for nuclear 
installaƟ ons in the country. In reply, the Government of Japan stressed that 
it would propose a special independent authority, which would in the future, 
oversee the crisis measures and prevenƟ on, and was not under the control of 
the Ministry of the Economy, as its predecessor had been, which is not a suit-
able situaƟ on.5 
• Against human behavior:
– Against the violence and destrucƟ on that can result from the use of nuclear, 
biological, chemical,6 seismic and other weapons in possible future confl icts. 
1 ZEM‚ MARS A JUPITER. [online]. (Cited 31.5.2011). Available on the Internet: hƩ p://
www.wesmir.weblahko.sk/ZEM-_-MARSA-JUPITER.html.
2 ŠKREKA, M. 2009. Zrážka s Jupiterom. [online]. 22.7.2009. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available 
on the Internet: hƩ p://astrin.planetarium.sk/zobraz.php?id=64.
3 HUSÁRIK, M. 2008. ASTEROIDY. Astronomický ústav SAV, Tatranská Lomnica. [online]. 
2008. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available on the Internet: hƩ p://www.astro.sk/~choc/08_
casu/zbornik/husarik/husarik.pdf.
4 Ibid.
5 MAAE: Japonsko podcenilo hrozbu tsunami. In 24hod.sk. [online]. 1. júna 2011. (Cited 
3.6.2011). Available on the Internet: hƩ p://www.24hod.sk/maae-japonsko-podceni-
lo-hrozbu-tsunami-cl162801.html.
6 DURDIAK, J. – GÁFRIK, A. – PULIŠ, P. – SUŠKO, M. 2005. Zbrane hromadného ničenia 
– aktuálna bezpečnostná hrozba. MO SR, InšƟ tút bezpečnostných a obranných štúdií 
MO SR. BraƟ slava. 2005. [online]. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available on the Internet: hƩ p://
www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=67.
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The nuclear powers are: the USA, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, the 
People’s Republic of China,7 Israel, India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
(it is possible that atomic weapons are owned by the South African Republic 
and Taiwan). It is known that interconƟ nental ballisƟ c missiles are owned by 
the USA, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, and probably by the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. The military atomic programs of other States are un-
clear. North Korea has an advanced nuclear program as does Iran. 
– Against reckless mismanagement of resources, whether human, fi nancial, 
material, energy, food, water, soil, forests, etc.
– Against unforeseen consequences of human acƟ viƟ es. An example of this 
was an accident involving two submarines. In February the French submarine 
Le Triomphant and the BriƟ sh submarine Vanguard collided with each other. 
They are responsible for the naƟ onal security of their respecƟ ve countries. Le 
Triomphant is capable of carrying 16 nuclear missiles, and Vanguard may have 
in its inventory 48 of them.8 Submarines have sunk. The Russian submarine 
Kursk sank on the boƩ om of the of Barents sea on 12 August 2000; all sailors 
of the crew perished.9 On April 9, 1963, the nuclear submarine Thresher sank 
also. This military submarine crashed to the boƩ om of the Wilkenson Trench 
in AtlanƟ c Ocean during its training. All 129 US Navy sailors on board per-
ished.10
– Harm to the natural planet, causing an increase in the greenhouse eﬀ ect, the 
loss of biodiversity, polluƟ on of the environment, etc.) before the geneƟ c ca-
pabiliƟ es of man, restricƟ ons, limits, mutaƟ ons and geneƟ c modifi caƟ on of 
products, environmental impacts caused by man (chemical, agricultural, en-
ergy, industrial producƟ on, e.g. processing of waste, etc.).
– Against accidents, whether due to improper or hazardous work pracƟ ces (fall-
ing under the remit of Health and Safety) or accidents at home or while trav-
elling.
According to the results of our survey,11 respondents assume the biggest 
threats to be waste (20.5%), industry (20.2%), mining (19.9%), energy supply 
(15.6%), transport (15.3%) and fi nally agricultural producƟ on (8.5%). 
7 ŠIPEKY, M. 2004. Defi novanie asymetrie. 2.11.2004. [online]. (Cited 3.6.2011) Avail-
able on the Internet: hƩ p://www.valka.cz/clanek_10821.html.
8 SZALAI, P. 2009. Francúzi a BriƟ  tajili atómovú nehodu v AtlanƟ ku. 16.2.2009. [online]. 
(Cited 3. 6. 2011). The arƟ cle was published in the newspaper SME daily. Available on 
the Internet: hƩ p://www.sme.sk/c/4311923/francuzi-a-briƟ -tajili-atomovu-neho-
du-v-atlanƟ ku.html. 
9 BÉZA, M. 2000. Ruské ponorky. K-141 Kursk. [online]. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available on 
the Internet: hƩ p://www.military.cz/russia/navy/submarin/oscarclass/kursk/kursk.
htm.
10 Námorné katastrofy. 9.10.2008. [online]. (Cited 4.6.2011). Available on the Internet: 
hƩ p://www.priestor.estranky.sk/clanky/tragedie-zeme/namorne-katastrofy.
11 VARHOĽÁK, P. 2010. Vybrané environmentálne hodnotenia pre 21. storočie. In: Týždeň 
vedy a umenia na Pedagogickej fakulte Katolíckej univerzity v Ružomberku. Zborník 
prednášok z týždňa európskej vedy. Ružomberok 29.11.–3.12. Ružomberok : VERBUM, 
2011. pp. 156–166.
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From the perspecƟ ve of the threats caused by human in our survey (the diﬀ er-
ences are not so great)12 our respondents viewed the largest: polluƟ on of world 
drinking water and ozone depleƟ on (9.95%), air polluƟ on (9.83%), the threat of 
the disappearance of organisms and biocenoses (9.66%), the greenhouse eﬀ ect 
(9.53%), radioacƟ ve contaminaƟ on of the natural environment (9.21%), acid rain 
(9,19%), destrucƟ on of natural ecosystems (9.11%), polluƟ on and erosion of the 
soil (8.83%), over salƟ ng (7.53) and wetness, soil, and fi nally weathering (6.87%). 
Respondents considered the greatest natural threats to be fl oods (20%), followed 
by avalanches (18%), wind (17%), earthquake (16%), tsunami (15%) and fi nally 
volcanic acƟ vity (14%).13 It has been asked whether it is possible to ensure the 
safety of countries and naƟ onal insƟ tuƟ ons, by accepƟ ng a measure of outsourc-
ing and privaƟ zaƟ on. The extreme case of privaƟ zaƟ on is that of naƟ onal defense, 
and is a controversial proposal in the light of future developments, threats, tur-
moil, and the eﬀ ecƟ veness of security needed to counteract this. The privaƟ za-
Ɵ on of security at the level of individual countries and alliances on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, organizaƟ ons with a global scope, for example, terrorist 
groups, have led to the privaƟ zaƟ on of wars and military confl icts. 
“The role of private security and military organizaƟ ons as a tool of interven-
Ɵ on in confl ict scenarios increased constantly and exponenƟ ally  aŌ er the Cold 
War, in many cases, a return to order and stability in confl ict zones and [a means 
of carrying out] peacekeeping operaƟ ons and [distribuƟ ng] humanitarian aids. 
Nevertheless, its real contribuƟ on to ensuring peace is quesƟ onable”.14 
The phenomenon of the privaƟ zaƟ on of war has historic precedents and once 
again is becoming popular 
“PrivaƟ zaƟ on of war was the objecƟ ve reality of poliƟ cal developments. Glo-
balizaƟ on, informaƟ on technology, democracy and devoluƟ on of power were 
the cause of the privaƟ zaƟ on of war. The trend towards the privaƟ zaƟ on of war 
should be a cause of concern for global, naƟ onal and personal security”.15 
DecentralizaƟ on of power in the 21st century shows the Table 1.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 MACIAS, A. 2011. PrivaƟ zaƟ on of Security: a Strategy for Peace or War? [online]. (Cited 
4.6.2011) Available on the Internet: hƩ p://www.inter-disciplinary.net/wp-content/
uploads/2011/04/maciaswpaper.pdf.
15 YUZHI, Zhang – HUIPING, Liu 2010. On the Basic Reasons of Private War. In Canadian 
Center of Science and EducaƟ on. Journal of PoliƟ cs and Law, vol. 3, no. 2; September 
2010. pp. 134–138. (Cited 4.6.2011) [online]. Available on the Internet: hƩ p://ccsenet.
org/journal/index.php/jpl/arƟ cle/view/7195/5542
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Table 1 DevoluƟ on of power in the 21st century 
Privacy Members of the Public The third sector
Super State TransnaƟ onal CorporaƟ on
Intergovernmental 
organizaƟ ons
Non-governmental 
organizaƟ ons
Country DomesƟ c corporaƟ ons
The Central Government 
in 21st century
NaƟ onal 
oganizaƟ ons
Sub-naƟ onal 
organizaƟ on Local business Local Government Local groups
Source: YUZHI, Zhang – HUIPING, Liu 2010. On the Basic Reasons of Private War. In Cana-
dian Center of Science and EducaƟ on. Journal of PoliƟ cs and Law, vol. 3, no. 2; September 
2010. pp. 134 – 138. (Cited 4. 6. 2011) [online]. Available on the Internet: hƩ p://ccsenet.
org/journal/index.php/jpl/arƟ cle/view/7195/5542. 
Possible approaches  to the view of the relaƟ onship and the focus of safety-
related systems in response to a post in aggregate form16 are illustrated in fi g-
ure 1.
European security 
In terms of European security strategy from 2003 threats to European security 
include: the proliferaƟ on of weapons of mass destrucƟ on, environmental deg-
radaƟ on, climate change, limited access to energy resources, the threat of Eu-
ropean energy crisis, failure or collapse of computer technologies, technological 
accidents, natural disasters, epidemics, or pandemics and humanitarian crisis, 
terrorism, regional confl icts, the collapse of state authority, organized crime, an 
ageing populaƟ on in the countries of the EU, illegal migraƟ on, the threat to the 
European social model due to the infl uence of the unforeseen consequences of 
globalizaƟ on, the radicalizaƟ on of society from ethnic and social causes, corrup-
Ɵ on and money laundering.17 
Table 2 shows the threat to European security.
16 VEBER, J. a kol. 2010. Management kvality, environmentu a bezpečnosƟ  práce. Legis-
laƟ va, systémy, metody, praxe. 2. aktualizované vydání. Praha : Management Press, 
2010. BALABÁN, M. 2009. Vize evropské bezpečnosƟ  v globálním kontextu (refl exe 
bezpečnostních analýz a prognóz ve světě, v EU a v ČR 2003 – 2009). In Bezpečnost 
a obrana v evropském kontextu. Univerzita obrany. Ústav strategických a obranných 
studií. Sborník z mezinárodní konference. Brno : IDET, 6.–7. května 2009. Libor FRANK, 
Petr HLAVÁČEK (eds.), 2009.
17 BALABÁN, M. 2009. 
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Leadership
System
management
The subject of
interest
Typical issues
Benefits for
Quality
management
Environmental systems Security
management
Managing the
defense
Quality of the
products
(products and
services)
Environmental
surroundings (more
closely around the man
and the wider world)
Security,
protection, health,
law and order,
The management
of the defense of
the country,
alliances and their
rights, interests
The customer,
the consumer
The company, Man,
humanity
Staff Member,
Man
Citizen, Ally
Food
Products.
The need
for service
vehicles
Water, air, climate,
soil, forces, living
organisms, working
and living
environment,
conquering the
cosmos, threats from
the cosmos
At work, in the
transport sector,
in the
household from
fires, water and
accidents
Defense,
security, peace,
national
interests, rights,
obtaining,
maintaining
resources
Management
resources
Human, financial, capital, material, energy, raw materials, research, development,
manufacturing, technology, information, knowledge, etc.
Outsourcing
and
privatization
Security and privatization, outsourcing national security, quality management in
social security, in defense of the country, in the conduct of the war, etc.
Figure 1 RelaƟ ons, and the focus of safety-related systems
Source: custom processing
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Table 2 Threats of European security 
  Threats18 Trends  EvaluaƟ on by
 and evaluaƟ on19 the results of 
  quesƟ onnaire 
  survey20
The proliferaƟ on of 
weapons of mass de-
strucƟ on
Slowing their spread, conƟ nuaƟ on of 
the persistence of threats from Iran, 
terrorist organizaƟ ons and their smug-
gling
15.4%
DegradaƟ on of the envi-
ronment climate change 
Global limits are exceeded, parƟ cularly 
in climate change, harm to the nitrogen 
cycle and loss of biodiversity, degrada-
Ɵ on conƟ nues, 
14.2%
Limited access to energy 
resources, the threat of 
European energy crisis
The situaƟ on aŌ er the shuƫ  ng-down 
of nuclear power plants; this is com-
plicated by by the possible knock-on 
eﬀ ect of German plans to phase out 
nuclear energy by 2022; this may lead 
to an increase in prices and higher 
dependency on Russia
13.6%
The failure or collapse of 
computer technologies
Cyber-aƩ acks create diﬃ  cult situaƟ ons, 
they are beginning to be seen as an act 
of war,, the case of Wikileaks; virtual 
network as a Trojan horse, problems 
aﬀ ecƟ ng naƟ onal security.
13.5%
Technological accidents
Extensive projects with aggressive in-
vesƟ gaƟ on of fi nancial resources from 
the calculaƟ on of damages resulƟ ng 
from accidents.
13.4%
Natural disasters Nature is more powerful than man 12.5%
The epidemic, or pan-
demic
The case of E-coli is a warning, showing 
possible mulƟ dimensional threats (ter-
rorism, mutaƟ ons, hygiene)
10.1%
Humanitarian crisis
The world reacts too late, oŌ en ineﬀ ec-
Ɵ vely, and someƟ mes not at all, there 
are many vicƟ ms; someƟ mes humani-
tarian crises are man-made.
7.3%
18 Selected from: BALABÁN, M. 2009. 
19 Own project of authors (see below).
20 The fi rst eight items are sorted in descending order according to the percentage of re-
spondents of survey of 58 Master degree students in eight teams (see: VARHOĽÁK, P.: 
Vybrané environmentálne hodnotenia pre 21. storočie. In: Týždeň vedy a umenia na 
Pedagogickej fakulte Katolíckej univerzity v Ružomberku. Zborník prednášok z týždňa 
európskej vedy. Ružomberok 29.11.–3. 12. Ružomberok: VERBUM, 2011. S. 156–166).
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Terrorism
Despite countermeasures by gover-
ments, the problem of terrorism does 
not lessen, the asymmetries persist
Regional confl icts Persist, without any decease in the intensity of the threat
The collapse of State 
authority
The huge defi cit results in popular pro-
tests in countries such as Greece and 
wars in African countries 
Organized crime
Dealing with organized crime some-
Ɵ mes may be beyond the capabiliƟ es 
of state bodies.
An ageing populaƟ on in 
the countries of the EU
There is a defi nite trend, which may be 
limited by immigraƟ on; this, however, 
can have other negaƟ ve eﬀ ects.
Illegal migraƟ on The trend is increasing, challenging the Schengen principles 
The threat to the Euro-
pean social model (social 
security)
The trend reinforces social inequality, 
there no reducƟ on in unemployment 
but rather a deepening of the problem; 
compeƟ Ɵ on is intensifying, and the 
mission of non-governmental organiza-
Ɵ ons is more socially quesƟ onable.
RadicalizaƟ on of part of 
society from ethnic and 
social causes
The Trend is increasing, and the situa-
Ɵ on is deterioraƟ ng; measures to coun-
teract this trend are inadequate and 
soluƟ ons are ineﬃ  cient.
Processed according to the: BALABÁN, M. 2009. Vize evropské bezpečnosƟ  v globálním 
kontextu (refl exe bezpečnostních analýz a prognóz ve světě, v EU a v ČR 2003–2009). In 
Bezpečnost a obrana v evropském kontextu. Univerzita obrany. Ústav strategických a ob-
ranných studií. Sborník z mezinárodní konference. Brno : IDET, 6.–7. května 2009. Libor 
FRANK, Petr HLAVÁČEK (eds.), 2009.
Source of authors: VARHOĽÁK, P. 2010. Vybrané environmentálne hodnotenia pre 21. sto-
ročie. In: Týždeň vedy a umenia na Pedagogickej fakulte Katolíckej univerzity v Ružomber-
ku. Zborník prednášok z týždňa európskej vedy. Ružomberok 29. 11. – 3. 12. Ružomberok : 
VERBUM, 2011. ISBN 978-80-8084-682-4. pp. 156 – 166.
From the point of view of energy security issues in the security strategies for 
low energy sources can be considered as a global challenge to mankind this cen-
tury. The earthquake and tsunami in March 2011 in Japan caused a nuclear disas-
ter in Fukushima, which greatly aﬀ ected the nuclear energy situaƟ on all over the 
world, but in parƟ cular in Japan itself. Germany will close all of its 17 nuclear pow-
er plants at the latest by the year 2022, as agreed by the coaliƟ on of Chancellor 
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Angela Merkel.21 This can cause a knock-on eﬀ ect, followed by problems in the 
procurement of energy for exisƟ ng prices. The industrial sector has reservaƟ ons 
regarding this policy. According to the President of the Federal AssociaƟ on of 
German industry, Hans-Peter Keitela, it risks weakening Germany as an indus-
trial naƟ on; car manufacturer and head of Daimler Dieter Zetsche has evoked the 
possibility of fi nancial risk; energy group RWE is considering a legal defense. The 
coaliƟ on has also agreed to speed up the construcƟ on of new power plants using 
fossil fuels, energy storage and transmission networks. According to news agency 
Reuters the country intends to reduce the consumpƟ on of electricity by by about 
10% by 2020, and double the percentage of renewable energy in the energy use 
of the country from 17 percent (the approximate current fi gure) to 35 percent.22 
According to Reuters Agency, the Slovak Prime Minister stated that extensive de-
commissioning of nuclear power staƟ ons in Europe on the basis of a possible EU 
decision would lead to a huge increase in gas prices.23 
In table 3 are some of the characterisƟ cs of possible strategies. Various com-
binaƟ ons of privaƟ zaƟ on are possible. It is emblemaƟ c that most countries in 
war confl icts now have oŌ en due to oil and natural gas, but also water and other 
scarce or valuable raw materials.
Table 3 Matrix of strategic approaches to the source of energy
Combined 
strategies
Resource 
strategies Priority
Shortcom-
ings Threats To OpportuniƟ es
Slovak Repub-
lic, EU ecolog-
ical trends
Combus-
Ɵ on of 
wood
Avail-
ability 
depends 
on the 
quality 
of the 
soil
The geo-
graphical 
restricƟ on
Felling forests, 
erosion
Sustainability, 
expansion
Slovak Re-
public, EU, 
People’s 
Republic of 
China, replac-
ing kernel
The com-
busƟ on of 
coal, etc
A global 
view 
of the 
availabil-
ity 
The geo-
graphical 
restricƟ on
Greenhouse ef-
fect, the break-
down in hun-
dreds of years
Use in chem-
istry
21 Nemecko končí s jadrom, zatvorí všetky jadrové elektrárne? ČTK. 30. mája 2011. [online]. 
(Cited 30.5.2011) Available on the Internet: hƩ p://spravy.pravda.sk/nemecko-konci-s-
jadrom-zatvori-vsetky-jadrove-elektrarne-pmi-/sk_svet.asp?c=A110530_083222_sk_
svet_p23.
22 Ibid.
23 Grékom miliardové injekcie nepomôžu, tvrdí Radičová. 30.5.2011. [online]. (Ci-
ted 30.5.2011) SITA, TASR. Available on the Internet: hƩ p://ekonomika.sme.sk/
c/5915446/grekom-miliardove-injekcie-nepomozu-tvrdi-radicova.html.
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States of the 
EU, in the fu-
ture People’s 
Republic of 
China, North 
America
Combus-
Ɵ on of 
petroleum 
products, 
natural 
gas, shale 
oil.
High 
usability, 
high rate 
of indis-
pens-
ability 
(for avia-
Ɵ on)
The geo-
graphical 
restricƟ on
Greenhouse 
eﬀ ect, limited 
availability, pol-
luƟ on of surface 
water, the seas,
Use in chem-
istry, more 
eﬃ  cient com-
bined technol-
ogies (cars)
Slovak Repub-
lic, France, 
USA, Russia, 
Iran, Japan
“Burning” 
of break-
down 
products
Avail-
ability, 
declared 
eﬃ  -
ciency
High 
intensity 
produc-
Ɵ on
The danger 
of leakage of 
radioacƟ vity, 
polluƟ on, waste 
disposal, an at-
tracƟ ve terrorist 
target, tsunami, 
earthquakes, 
technological 
and space re-
quirements
More eﬃ  cient 
and safer 
technologies, 
solve energy 
storage 
People’s 
Republic Of 
China, Austria
The com-
busƟ on of 
biogas
Availabil-
ity, geo-
graphic 
distribu-
Ɵ on
IniƟ al in-
vestment
Technology and 
space require-
ments
Sustainability, 
usability
Slovak Re-
public, Czech 
Republic, EU, 
Austria, Peo-
ple’s Republic 
of China
Hydro 
power
Availabil-
ity varies 
with the 
weather
The geo-
graphical 
restric-
Ɵ on, in-
vestment
Technology and 
space require-
ments
Sustainability, 
maintenance 
of water
Austria, Mari-
Ɵ me States
Wind 
energy
Avail-
ability is 
depen-
dent on 
the wind
The geo-
graphical 
restric-
Ɵ on, in-
vestment
Technology and 
space require-
ments
Sustainability, 
resolving to 
save energy
Austria, eco-
logical trends
Solar 
energy on 
Earth
Avail-
ability is 
depen-
dent 
on the 
weather
Invest-
ments
Technology and 
space require-
ments
Sustainability, 
resolving to 
save energy
ScienƟ fi c 
trends and 
visions, satel-
lites
Solar 
energy 
from the 
cosmos
Univer-
sal avail-
ability
The geo-
graphical 
restric-
Ɵ on, in-
vestment
Technology and 
space require-
ments
Sustainability, 
resolving to 
save energy
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ScienƟ fi c 
trends and 
ideas
Thermo-
nuclear 
energy
Energy 
bomb, 
potenƟ al 
availabil-
ity
Dozens 
of years 
of invest-
ment
Unknown Unknown
Unknown Other Un-known Unknown Unknown Unknown
Source: custom processing.
Slovak security in the Euro-Atlantic framework
The issue of the security of the Slovak Republic is condiƟ onal on a historical di-
mension, experience and knowledge of the elites, public opinion, moral and ethi-
cal orientaƟ on, the strength of their own State, economy, law, morality, etc. In 
the State administraƟ on and territorial self-government the following general 
shortcomings were idenƟ fi ed:24 
• the system of state administraƟ on and territorial self government is insuf-
fi ciently eﬀ ecƟ ve and transparent, 
• the heads of staﬀ  are have inadequate managerial ability and other skills that 
are necessary for execuƟ ve management, 
• the lack of cooperaƟ on of the ministries, 
• the low level of communicaƟ on and cooperaƟ on between the central author-
iƟ es of State administraƟ on and territorial self-government,
• the misunderstanding of procedural control (procedural control = the focus 
on the causes that lead to the result; funcƟ onal management = focus on re-
sults), 
• lack of fi nancial moƟ vaƟ on of human resources,
• Insuﬃ  cient educaƟ on and training of human resources.
Problems in improving the quality of insƟ tuƟ onal capaciƟ es can be seen in:
1. lack of fi nancial moƟ vaƟ on of human resources, 
2. lack of educaƟ on and training of human resources, 
3. lack of opƟ mizaƟ on of the acƟ viƟ es carried out by human resources.
Slovak Prime Minister Iveta Radičová, during her visit to Slovenia pointed to 
the fact that the economic crisis is far from over, and that the Eurozone and other 
EU member countries are looking for the appropriate tools and resources to spur 
economic growth and address its implicaƟ ons. In interviews with the Slovenian 
24 Národný strategický referenčný rámec Slovenskej republiky na roky 2007–2013. Minis-
terstvo výstavby a regionálneho rozvoja Slovenskej republiky. BraƟ slava, 29. jún 2007. 
[online]. (Cited 30. 5. 2011) Available on the Internet: hƩ p://www.bing.com/searc
h?q=N%C3%A1rodn%C3%BD+strategick%C3%BD+referen%C4%8Dn%C3%BD+r%C
3%A1mec+Slovenskej+republiky+na+roky+2007+%E2%80%93+2013.+Ministerstvo
+v%C3%BDstavby+a+region%C3%A1lneho+rozvoja+Slovenskej+republiky.&src=IE-
SearchBox&FORM=IE8SRC. p. 27.
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press she indicated that ciƟ zens did not realize the gravity of the problems facing 
the EU and the Eurozone. She further stated:
“Pushing the expectaƟ ons, which I’m afraid, in the coming years simply will 
not be able to be fulfi lled.”
It is therefore necessary to consolidate public fi nances, or implement painful 
reforns for the ciƟ zens
“If we do, the crisis will have a much more serious impact. It is our duty, de-
spite the misunderstanding and oŌ en Ɵ mes the resistance of the public to pro-
mote these measures seriously.”25
In view of the defense of the State, the concept of Defense (EU, NATO), which 
alone has the power to defend the sovereignty, the nature of the State ConsƟ tu-
Ɵ on, and the lives and property of people, the situaƟ on is not simple, while the 
importance of security in the current turbulent environment is growing: 
“…under the pressure of current security threats, in the event of future large-
scale crises and confl icts, it will be just the armed forces, which, as the military 
tool of crisis management, in the case of the failure of diplomaƟ c eﬀ orts, will 
represent the most eﬀ ecƟ ve means to deal with the external security problems, 
as well as the prevenƟ on and eliminaƟ on of security crises and confl icts in today’s 
world. And even though the security risks and threats by State or non-State actors 
can never be removed or at least eliminated completely, the adopƟ on of eﬀ ecƟ ve 
and eﬃ  cient measures with as much funding as possible reduces the negaƟ ve 
eﬀ ects of possible security crises, including armed confl icts, for the developed 
States of the world, including the Slovak Republic.”26
QuesƟ ons and problems relaƟ ng to our defense should be assessed by ex-
perts in this domain, taking ino account the analysis of domesƟ c and foreign rela-
Ɵ ons.
It is necessary to refuse further “reforms”, which basically almost always 
meant a reducƟ on in military numbers of the area without any concept, only in 
order to meet poliƟ cal orders27:
• Various, diverse, fast and expensive reorganizaƟ on – Models of the Armed 
Force 2010, 2015, 2020, as the new minister (12) and three in one parliamen-
tary term, it is faster and beƩ er “redeployment”, but can be incomplete.28 
• None of the exisƟ ng text of the “models” - Model of the Armed Forces 
2010, 2015 and 2020 – are realisƟ c from the fi nancial point of view, as ther 
resources alloƩ ed were signifi cantly lower than originally planned, creaƟ ng 
25 Grékom miliardové injekcie nepomôžu, tvrdí Radičová. 30. 5. 2011. 
26 IVANČÍK, R. 2011. Financovanie obrany v kríze. [online]. (Cited 2. 6. 2011) Available on 
the Internet: hƩ p://cenaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/TransatlanƟ cke-listy-
1_2011.pdf.
27 ONDREJCSÁK, R. 2011. Strategické hodnotenie obrany: Kde sme a kam smerujeme? 
[online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: hƩ p://cenaa.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/04/TransatlanƟ cke-listy-1_2011.pdf 
28 MIKLUŠ, M. 2011. Armáda je v  ?! 24.04.2011. [online]. (Cited 2. 6. 2011) Available on 
the Internet: hƩ p://www.despiteborders.com/clanky/data/upimages/miklus2.pdf 
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a huge gap between the resources invested in defense and what had been 
planned.29 
• It has been known since 2005 that the army will have problems, only for this 
fact to be kept ‘under the lid’.30
• So far, the biggest problems – in addiƟ on to the frequent lack of systemaƟ za-
Ɵ on – were just unrealisƟ c fi nancial projecƟ ons and, consequently, unrealisƟ c 
planning.31
• In addiƟ on to the progressive reducƟ on of budgets for the army, there was 
a very rapid and extremely massive staﬀ  release of the most experienced sol-
diers (oŌ en even against their will), and the freezing of resources to the arma-
ment of troops, including its modernizaƟ on.32
• It is not the fi rst Ɵ me that such a process has been implemented by the 
Slovak Republic (preparaƟ on of strategy documents, preparaƟ on of Model 
of the Armed Forces of the SR 2010 and 2015), but is this current model 
acceptable?33
• The Army Joint-Chiefs of Staﬀ  lost the competence parƟ cularly in the area of 
actual (not paper) decision-making on fi nancing and procurement of equip-
ment necessary for the performance of its tasks.34
• These competencies were taken over by the oﬃ  cials of the Ministry of De-
fense – transferred to the Minister of Defense, and the head of the Ministry 
Staﬀ , which means that decisions are oŌ en made without the consent of the 
army.
• It is also necessary to state that defense cuts result in resources for the army 
being spread too thin.35
• The fi rst impression given is of a relaxed and someƟ mes unprofessional ap-
proach on the part of those poliƟ cians responsible for naƟ onal defense, and 
of lack of understanding on the part of ciƟ zens as to the the desirability of 
the existence of a naƟ onal army and its membership of NATO, the EU and the 
fulfi llment of its commitments.
• As the system does not funcƟ on, the integrated Ministry of Defense of the 
Slovak Republic, bears the main responsibility for solving the long-term crisis 
in the military.
• It is also necessary to ask what responsibility the Security Council (the for-
mer Council of Defense of the State), CommiƩ ee on Defense and the Security 
29 ONDREJCSÁK, R. 2011. 
30 MIKLUŠ, M. 2011. 
31 ONDREJCSÁK, R. 2011. 
32 MIKLUŠ, M. 2011. 
33 BARTKO, F. 2011. Strategické hodnotenie obrany: prostriedok na vyriešenie problémov 
OS SR? [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: hƩ p://cenaa.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2011/04/TransatlanƟ cke-listy-1_2011.pdf.
34 MIKLUŠ, M. 2011. 
35 MIKLUŠ, M. 2011. 
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Council of the SR, but also of the Government of the Slovak Republic have in 
this domain.
• Defense is not only a maƩ er of the Armed Forces (as is oŌ en simplifi ed and 
wrongly understood, and as has also been presented within the objecƟ ves 
and procedures of the SHO (Strategic Defense Review)), but is the responsi-
bility of the State and all its components.36 Thus, this will be a real means of 
addressing the SHO (strategic defense review) of the current situaƟ on, when 
not only are the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic in a criƟ cal situaƟ on, 
but the quesƟ on of the security system of the State and the credibility of the 
Slovak Republic within the framework of NATO and the EU has not yet been 
answered, and it is this credibility which is rapidly decreasing due to the fail-
ure of the commitments undertaken by the State.
• It is perhaps also worth examining the level of preparedness and the ability 
of the competent representaƟ ves of the State (legislaƟ ve and execuƟ ve), who 
bear responsibility for defense and security.37
• We agree that the security policy and defense of the Slovak Republic was psy-
chologically perceived as isolated from the rest of the world, and the country 
was perceived as a “small state”.38
• It would be of benefi t to inform the public of the exact purpose of the armed 
forces.
• AŌ er more than 18 years, we have reached a criƟ cal point and that cannot be 
overcome in the short term and in this and other extreme defi cit years.
• Defense (the Army) in the Slovak Republic is not suﬃ  ciently important, not 
even from the perspecƟ ve of the NaƟ onal Government the Security Council 
and the Ministry of Defense), despite internaƟ onal commitments and prom-
ises made to NATO and the EU.
• A huge issue is crisis communicaƟ on in the framework of soluƟ ons of non-
military threats (System of warnings to the populaƟ on, communicaƟ on be-
tween the stakeholders of the integrated rescue system (IZS), Armed Forces 
of the Slovak Republic and crisis staﬀ s at all levels, technical equipment), the 
coordinaƟ on of the deployment and management of the forces and means of 
IZS and Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, the ability of the Government 
authoriƟ es to analyze in parƟ cular, threats to the populaƟ on, to prepare con-
Ɵ ngency plans, and respond properly to the management of crises aŌ er their 
the emergence.39
• The immediate cause was the economic crisis, which forced severe restric-
Ɵ ons and drasƟ c cuts in public spending, aﬀ ecƟ ng defense and requiring re-
forms to the structure of the armed forces.40
36 BARTKO, F. 2011. 
37 MIKLUŠ, M. 2011. 
38 ONDREJCSÁK, R. 2011. 
39 BARTKO, F. 2011. 
40 VALÁŠEK, T. 2011. Obranné reformy v NATO. [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on 
the Internet: hƩ p://cenaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/TransatlanƟ cke-listy-
1_2011.pdf.
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• There is also a lack of coordinaƟ on between individual member states of 
NATO. With a few excepƟ ons, each country examines its situaƟ on in isola-
Ɵ on.
• There is no guarantee that NATO virtually disappear from some important 
types of experience or technology.
• Over 80% of all military equipment purchased (the allies) from domesƟ c 
fi rms, only 13% of the orders is not open to foreign suppliers and 95% of all 
military equipment is owned by the States, not the common property.
• Even though military operaƟ ons take place today mostly under the control of 
NATO, the EU or the United NaƟ ons, each country educates soldiers virtually 
on its own.
• Among 1.6 million troops in the European countries of NATO, only a few thou-
sand serve in integrated internaƟ onal units. The remaining armed forces are 
formed by the government in a way that has essenƟ ally remained unaﬀ ected 
for centuries: the emphasis is on maximum autonomy.
• War is fought today virtually only on the basis of coaliƟ ons or alliances.
• AŌ er the whole of the successful reforms in the years 2000–2005, since 2006 
the Armed Forces have not received support from successive Prime Ministers. 
For the fi rst Ɵ me in the history of the independence of the Slovak Republic, 
not only was there a reducƟ on in defense spending, but also a gradual change 
in percepƟ on of the armed forces on the part of the public. The comment by 
the then Prime Minister, that the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic are 
costly and unnecessary, contributed to this.41
• Frank Boland – “Status of the Slovak army is especially criƟ cal,” NATO mem-
bership is not free and therefore the Alliance conƟ nues to set aside its re-
quest for the defense of the resources to the amount of 2% of GDP.
• Lack of courage of the leaders, and managers, unjusƟ fi ed secrecy, lobbying 
pressures, and lack of vision. Contributed greatly to the current state.
• Military educaƟ on been aﬀ ected by the liquidaƟ on of several academies.
• A signifi cant part of research & development, tesƟ ng and repair was elimi-
nated.
A search for a plan for the development of the security of Slovakia in the Alli-
ance framework is on the agenda. The following issues have been raised:
• An analysis of the current situaƟ on and a summit of Nato oﬃ  cials and states 
would certainly provide a necessary and posiƟ ve input into the issue of ne-
glected security. Detailed comprehensive professional unbiased and non-po-
liƟ cal analysis across departments is very necessary. The quesƟ on is whether 
it is even feasible. If not, the situaƟ on, in principle, cannot be changed for the 
beƩ er. Despite this risk, the analysis must be made.
• On the basis of the analyses, which should not last long, because the Act is 
to be as soon as possible, it is necessary to adopt clear strategic decisions on 
the highest level and convince senior management of the State, ministries 
41 IVANČÍK, R. 2011.
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(including the Ministry of Finance), public administraƟ on and self-govern-
ment, and of course the populaƟ on, because they will pay, that they should 
pay the cost of this.
• While poliƟ cal markeƟ ng thinks about short-term goals, markeƟ ng concern-
ing the security of the state and prevenƟ on is a recent phenomenon, 
• For the above reasons it is necessary to substanƟ ally improve the system of 
communicaƟ on in all relevant levels and areas.
• Of all changes that need to be made, the most crucial is to introduce transpar-
ency regarding the fl ow of money and informaƟ on.
• SubstanƟ al conclusions deriving from the strategic decisions should be en-
shrined in the management documents (ConsƟ tuƟ on, laws, a statement of 
the Government, etc.). The performance of related tasks should be control-
lable by ciƟ zens on the basis of deducƟ ons of relevant structures.
• One of the main components of the soluƟ on should be a binding intenƟ on of 
the ExecuƟ ve to commit in jusƟ fi able terms a necessary fi nancial budget. The 
remedy does not only lie in the earmarking of larger funds for security. This is 
a necessary condiƟ on, but is not in itself suﬃ  cient.
• How much money should be spent and for what purpose should not depend 
on dictates, business plans or poliƟ cal markeƟ ng but rather on honest analy-
sis and a minimum of consent across the relevant poliƟ cal and professional 
markets.
“In the countries of the North AtlanƟ c Alliance funding at the level of 2% of the 
GDP of the country is regarded as suﬃ  cient. This means that the more resources 
the Government and Parliament set aside in favor of the Ministry of Defense, 
and thus also for the benefi t of the armed forces, thus providing an improved 
defense, the more State can ensure that its armed forces achieve the highest pos-
sible level of capabiliƟ es. Of course, this is true if the allocated resources are used 
economically, eﬃ  ciently and eﬀ ecƟ vely, in accordance with the set tasks, objec-
Ɵ ves and prioriƟ es of the sector, country, group and in accordance with the ap-
plicable legislaƟ on”.42
• Yet the state managed to build a professional army, however Ɵ ny and weak. 
The need for suﬃ  cient fi nancial security stems from the following argument:
“In the case of the Slovak Republik the economics of defence are a challenge 
not only because of the defense of its territory and security assistance to the civil-
ian populaƟ on in the event of natural disasters or industrial disasters, but also 
due to the implementaƟ on of internaƟ onal commitments and eﬀ orts to conƟ nue 
the reconstrucƟ on of the armed forces of the Slovak Republic towards relaƟ vely 
small, but professional and modernly equipped armed forces with suﬃ  cient com-
bat potenƟ al, which are able to meet the requirements for compaƟ bility and in-
teroperability with the armed forces of the allies”.43
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid.
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• It is quesƟ onable whether the enƟ re breadth of the issues of security, de-
fense and protecƟ on in condiƟ ons of modern threats and contexts has been 
taken into account, namely that this issue combines factors of supranaƟ onal 
and naƟ onal defense. The quesƟ on is whether the new streamlined and ef-
fi cient authority, with suﬃ  cient competence, connected to the sources of 
scienƟ fi c and scienƟ fi c-technical intelligence informaƟ on, could be formed, 
which would with Ɵ me coordinate the issues comprehensively and ensure 
adequate, uniform and secure communicaƟ on between the individual de-
partments, public administraƟ on and Government.
“The white paper, in so far as it is to fulfi ll its purpose, cannot be “only” a doc-
ument of the MOD, it must be a document with which go along the whole (or ma-
jority) of the poliƟ cal spectrum of the State, and which will have a binding charac-
ter for shaping and implemenƟ ng not only the security policy of the State against 
the outside world, but especially for all the components of the State, which by law 
(or by common consent) entails obligaƟ ons and tasks in the fi eld of security and 
defense of the Slovak Republic. This means the document is approved by the Na-
Ɵ onal Council of the Slovak Republic and then it is valid for the enƟ re Slovak Re-
public. The white paper must be a document also for ordinary ciƟ zens, who also 
have their obligaƟ ons and responsibiliƟ es towards the defense of the State”.44
To respect the status of security and defense and the related fi nancing and 
funding science and research. 
Table 4 illustrates the relaƟ onship between GDP (gross domesƟ c product) of 
Slovakia, and expenditure on defense and expenditure on science and research. 
In theory and in pracƟ ce there is a known link between the costs and invest-
ments for defense and security, on the one hand, and the costs and investments 
for science and research in general (and defense and security in parƟ cular). The 
connecƟ on is confi rmed well in our case.
Chart 1 shows the relaƟ ons between the GDP, expenditure on defense and 
security, science and research, as indicated in table 4. It is obvious that GDP has 
increased but expenditure on defense and security and science and research as 
a percentage of GDP shows a constantly decreasing trend. CorrelaƟ on (by Ex-
cel funcƟ on of Corel) between GDP growth for the defense spending shows this 
decrease. The decline in defense spending as a percentage of GDP for the years 
1993 to 2011 represents a value of -0.8658, which is a very high negaƟ ve value 
(the maximum should not exceed -1).
44 BARTKO, F. 2011. 
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Table 4 cost of GDP (gross domesƟ c product) of Slovakia, and expenditure on 
defense and expenditure on science and research
 Year GDP in the Defense Science Expenditure Expenditure on
 Bill. EUR45 in% and research on defense Science and research
  GDP46 in% GDP47 in the Bill. EUR in the Bill. EUR
1993 17.022 2.34 1.45 0.398315 0.246819
1994 18.081 2.31 0.96 0.417671 0.173578
1995 26.11 2.51 0.98 0.655361 0.255878
1996 28.205 2.31 0.97 0.651536 0.273589
1997 29.393 2.13 1.13 0.626071 0.332141
1998 30.698 1.93 0.82 0.592471 0.251724
1999 30.704 1.7 0.68 0.521968 0.208787
2000 31.136 1.62 0.65 0.504403 0.202384
2001 32.191 1.61 0.64 0.518275 0.206022
2002 33.725 1.8 0.57 0.60705 0.192233
2003 35.332 1.77 0.58 0.625376 0.204926
2004 37.173 1.79 0.51 0.665397 0.189582
2005 39.614 1.7 0.51 0.673438 0.202031
2006 47.451 1.62 0.49 0.768706 0.23251
2007 47.451 1.51 0.46 0.71651 0.218275
2008 50.481 1.49 0.47 0.752167 0.237261
2009 48,068 1.49 0.48 0.716213 0.230726
2010 49.19 1.26 0.619794
2011 51.885 1.08 0.560358
2012 0.99
2013 0.91
Source: Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, InsƟ tute of Financial Policy of the Mini-
stry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the StaƟ sƟ cal Oﬃ  ce of the Slovak Republic. And the 
sources of the footnotes seen from table 4 and calculated in the last two columns.
45 Ekonomika Slovenska 2011. REÁLNA EKONOMIKA. Vývoj ukazovateľov reálnej eko-
nomiky Slovenskej republiky v období od roku 2005 do roku 2011. EuroEkonóm.sk 
ekonomická príručka moderného ekonóma. [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the 
Internet: hƩ p://www.euroekonom.sk/ekonomika/ekonomika-sr/ekonomika-sloven-
ska-2011; Ekonomické indikátory. Hrubý domáci produkt (HDP) v rokoch 1993–2011 
(mil. EUR). [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: hƩ p://openiazoch.zo-
znam.sk/zivot/makro/ukazovatele.asp?iid=HDP&year=ALL.
46 IVANČÍK, R. 2011.
47 VINCÚR, P. 2009. Základné determinanty sociálno-ekonomického rozvoja v dlhodo-
bom horizonte. Podiel výdavkov na vedu a výskum za HDP v SR za roky 1993. – Zdroj: 
ŠÚSR 1994-2008. [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: hƩ p://www.
prog.sav.sk/subory/konf20/Vincur.pdf; Národný program reforiem Slovenskej repub-
liky 2011–2014. apríl 2011. PRÍLOHA č. 1 – Národné ciele stratégie Európa 2020. [onli-
ne]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: hƩ p://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/
nrp/nrp_slovakia_sk.pdf.
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Graph 1 GDP in mulƟ ples of 10 Bill. EUROS, expenditure on defense and security, 
science and research in % (for the years 2012, 2013, the preliminary plans for the 
Defense)
Source: Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, InsƟ tute of Financial Policy of the Mi-
nistry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the StaƟ sƟ cal Oﬃ  ce of the Slovak Republic. And 
the sources of the footnotes seen from table 4.
Chart 2 shows the relaƟ onship between expenditure on defense and security, 
science and research, as indicated in table 4. It is clear that the expenditure on 
defense and security, science and research has demonstrated a constantly de-
creasing trend. CorrelaƟ on (Excel funcƟ on of Corel) as a percentage of GDP on 
defense and science and research for the years 1993 to 2009 represents the value 
of 0.860018, which is a very high posiƟ ve value (the maximum can reach 1).
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Chart 2 the comparison of expenditure on defense and science and research as 
% of GDP, 
Source: the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, InsƟ tute of Financial Policy the 
Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the StaƟ sƟ cal Oﬃ  ce of the Slovak Republic. And 
the sources of the footnotes seen from table 4.
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Chart 3 the comparison of expenditure on defense and security, and science and 
research in billions of Euros 
Source: Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, InsƟ tute of Financial Policy of the Mi-
nistry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the StaƟ sƟ cal Oﬃ  ce of the Slovak Republic. And 
the sources of the footnotes seen from table 4
Conclusion 
A high level of security and defense may be a guarantee for the long life of the 
ciƟ zens of the State. The departments are safe when they work properly. How-
ever, the realizaƟ on of this aim requires many things. The level of 2% of GDP in 
fi nancing defense and security was a reality in the 1997-1998 and the level of 
1.5% of GDP in 2007-2008 (table 4). Today it is likely that this will decrease fur-
ther. Under the infl uence of the crisis and the lack of fi nancial resources, as well 
as the dominance of the requirements for funding in the sectors of Slovakia but 
also in Europe, hopes for an increase in funding are opƟ misƟ c. Growth of 1.5% in 
this electoral term would be a posiƟ ve achievement. The elite should recognize 
the relaƟ onship between defense and security, and science and research in the 
private sector, because the argument from the period of the formaƟ on of the 
Slovak Republic is true only in so far as available resources and the willingness of 
the seller to sell military techniques and technologies. And it is not, nor has never 
been understood.
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